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Global Interest Rate Linkages
Long-term interest rates in Germany, Japan, and
the u.s. rose more or less in tandem in the early
part of this year. The la-year government bond
rate in Germany rose from an average of 7.3
percent in December to an average of 8.6 per-
cent in April; the comparable interest rate in
Japan rose from 5.8 percent to 7.3 percent during
the same period; and in the United States, the
rise was from 7.8 percent to 8.8 percent. During
most of this period the dollar appreciated against
the yen and depreciated against the OM.
These trends have created concern about the
apparent sensitivity of u.s. interest rates to
events affecting interest rates abroad. To the ex-
tent that such sensitivity exists, many observers
argue that the effectiveness of monetary policy in
controlling domestic interest rates and inflation
may be affected. This Letter discusses the mech-
anisms through which foreign "shocks" may
affect interest rates in the United States, and
attempts to interpret recent events within this
analytical framework.
Exchange rates and interest rates
Financial capital has become highly mobile
across international borders. Consequently,
a change in the level of interest rates in one
country can cause cross-border movements of
funds which affect exchange rates and the level
of interest rates in other countries. The way in
which exchange rates and interest rates change,
however, depends on the factors that caused in-
terest rates abroad to change in the first place.
These factors can be categorized as either
"nominal" or "real;' corresponding to the two
determinants of the level of long-term interest
rates: respectively, the expected rate of inflation
and the "real" interest rate, which is determined
by the real supply of and demand for credit.
Accordingly, the effects of developments in one
country on exchange rates and other countries'
domestic interest rates depend on whether
interest rate rises abroad are due to "nominal
shocks;' such as changes in inflationary expec-
tations, or to "real shocks;' such as changes in
saving or investment behavior.
To understand the recent trends in U.S. and for-
eign interest rates and changes in the value of
the dollar, then, it is useful to consider separately
the effects of the two kinds of shocks to foreign
interest rates: first, an increase in foreign inflation
expectations, and second, an increase in the
(actual or anticipated) real demand for capital
abroad. In this analysis, Germany and the u.s.
represent the foreign and domestic countries,
respectively, although the results are generally
applicable to ail other countries as well.
This analysis focuses on the near-term effectsof
the shock on the relative demands for different
assets, and assumes that the supplies of domestic
and foreign assets are given. It rules out consid-
eration of changes in money supplies associated
with possible monetary policy responses. In ad-
dition, financial capital is assumed to be per-
fectly mobile between countries. This rules out
any barriers to asset flows, such as capital con-
trols or taxes.
Increase in foreign inflation
A permanent rise in expected German inflation
is an example of a pure "nominal" shock; it has
no effect on the world equilibrium real rate of
return. A rise in German inflation expectations
initially will reduce the anticipated real return
to holding German assets from the point ofview
of German investors. Assuming that changes in
German inflation have at most a negligible effect
on U.S. inflation (because German goods repre-
sent only a small share of the basket of goods
consumed by U.s. residents), returns on u.s. as-
sets will not be affected, and the decline in real
German asset returns will induce a shift inFRBSF
demand away from German assets towards those
denominated in dollars, which offer a relatively
higher real return.
This shift in asset demand will cause the German
nominal interest rate to rise until the anticipated
rea! return on German assets is restored back to
the world equilibrium real rate. (As long as the
change in foreign inflation expectations leaves
the equilibrium world real interest rate un-
changed, u.s. as well as foreign equilibrium
real interest rates will be unchanged.) Moreover,
because u.S. inflation expectations are assumed
not to be affected by the rise in German inflation
expectations, U.S. nominal interest rates will
remain constant. Instead, the increase in the
demand for dollar-denominated assets will cause
the current value of the Oeutsche mark (OM) to
depreciate against the dollar.
In response to a permanent increase in expected
German inflation, the OM will be expected to
depreciate in the future at the same rate as Ger-
man inflation. Accordingly, in equilibrium, the
expectedrate of nominal depreciation of the OM
will exactly offset the rise in the nominal spread
between German and u.S. interest rates, leaving
the real interest rate spread at its initial level
(zero, assuming that capital is perfectly mobile
internationally and that U.S. and German assets
are perfect substitutes).
The result that U.S. nominal interest rates
remain unaffected by a change in German
expected inflation is independent of the degree
of asset substitutability between German and
u.s. assets. If u.s. and foreign assets are less than
perfect substitutes, u.s. residents will demand a
premium to hold more German assets in their
portfolios. This premium will raise the effective
nominal return for investing in German assets
(that is, the nominal yield abroad plus the ex-
pected depreciation of the OM) relative to U.s.
nominal interest rates. But there is no reason for
the size of the premium to change with a change
in inflation expectations. Thus, U.S. rates should
be unaffected by a change in German inflation
expectations even if German and u.s. assets
are imperfect substitutes.
In sum, flexible exchange rates generally insulate
the nominal interest return on U.S. assets from a
foreign nominal shock. In this case, foreign nomi-
nal interest rates and the exchange rate bear the
entire burden ofthe adjustment.
Increase in foreign demand
Consider next an increase in (actual or expected)
real investment demand in Germany. Such a shift
in demand raises the demand for capital in Ger-
many, and causes German real interest rates to
rise relative to U.S. real rates. Moreover, because
this shift in real investment demand tends to
raise the demand for German goods by more
than that for u.S. goods, the OM will be ex-
pected to appreciate against the dollar in real
terms (assuming the shift in investment demand
is expected to be permanent).
From the point of view of u.S. investors, then,
the effective real dollar return to investing in
German assets (that is, the higher German yield
plus the expected appreciation of the OM) ini-
tially will rise above the real return available
on dollar-denominated assets. Consequently,
investOis will shift their demand away from u.s.
assets, and u.s. real and nominal yields will rise.
Assuming that the shift in foreign demand is
permanent, but no further shifts occur, in the
long run, German and U.S. real interest rates
will be equalized (as long as capital is perfectly
mobile, and u.s. and German assets are perfect
substitutes, so that there is no risk premium). In
this new equilibrium, both the world real interest
rate and the real exchange value of the OM will
be permanently higher.
The magnitudes of thechanges in the levels of
the real interest rate and the real exchange rate
will depend in part on the sensitivities of u.s.
aggregate demand to changes in these variables.
For example, if u.s. demand is very sensitive to
the interest rate, but not very sensitive to the
exchange rate, small changes in the interest rate
and large changes in the exchange rate will be
necessary to restore equilibrium. Consequently,
an increase in German investment demand
would lead to a relatively small rise in the
equilibrium real interest rate and a relatively
large rise in the equilibrium real value of the
OM against the dollar.
Assuming the money supply in each country
remains constant, the rise in real (and nominal)
interest rates associated with the increase inGerman investment demand raises the opportu-
nity cost of holding money and reduces money
demand. As residents in each country attempt to
reduce their money holdings by spending these
balances on goods, national price levels will rise
unless the monetary authorities respond by
decreasing the money supply.
In sum, then, a floating exchange rate does not
insulate either the u.s. price level or U.S. real
and nominal interest rates from a real shock
emanating abroad.
Interpreting recent events
Many observers argue that differences in in-
flation rates across countries have been the dom-
inant force influencing the spreads between u.s.
and foreign interest rates in recent years. In this
environment, changes in the value of the dollar
to a large extent have insulated u.S. interest rates
from developments abroad. When U.s. inflation
was rising relative to inflation abroad from 1985
through 1987, the dollar was weak and the U.S.-
foreign yield spread widened to reflect the ex-
pected depreciation of the dollar. In 1988 when
inflation rates abroad began to converge with
that in the U.S., U.S.-foreign yield spreads
narrowed, and the dollar strengthened.
Currently, most economists are forecasting higher
inflation in Japan because of its booming econ-
omy and in West Germany because of the antici-
pated financial strain of rebuilding East Germany.
To the extent investors believe that the rate of
inflation will be higher in Japan and Germany
than in the U.S., the dollar should be stronger
against both the yen and OM.
However, recent developments do not accord
perfectly with this pattern, implying that inflation
fears may not be the whole story. First, although
the dollar has been rising against the yen, it has
been falling against the OM. Second, despite
these changes in the value of the dollar, U.S.
interest rates apparently have not been insulated
from the rise in foreign interest rates; instead,
U.S. rates have risen more or less simultaneously
with those abroad.
These observations suggest that recent financial
market developments may be due in part to real
forces. Anticipated efforts by West Germany to
improve the infrastructure and productive facili-
ties of East Germany, and possibly other coun-
tries in Eastern Europe, can be expected to
increase the real demand for credit, real interest
rates, and the level of the OM in the future. And
although little actual investment has taken place
as yet, the expectation of higher German invest-
ment demand in the future could be influencing
current real rates and exchange rates. Thus, the
anticipated greater competition for funds could
explain why u.s. interest rates have risen re-
cently together with foreign interest rates. It also
could explain why the dollar has depreciated
against the OM, but not against the yen.
One should not put too much weight on this
explanation, however, since other, independent
factors also may have been at work. For example,
it is possible that u.s. inflation expectations rose
independently in the first part of the year. This
may explain why U.S. nominal interest rates rose
simultaneously with foreign rates. The concern
about Japan's political future as a result of the
January elections and the Tokyo stock market
adjustment may have contributed to the weak-
ness of the yen.
Important distinction
In any case, this analysis suggests that it is
important to distinguish between nominal and
real shocks when interpreting developments in
international markets. The response of U.S. inter-
est rates to foreign shocks depends critically on
whether the shock is nominal or real in nature.
Changes in the value of the dollar generally will
insulate U.s. nominal interest rates from foreign
nominal shocks, such as an increase in foreign
inflation expectations. However, the dollar will
not insulate U.s. rates from a foreign real shock,
such as an exogenous increase in real capital
demand abroad (as long as international capital
is sufficiently mobile). In this case, any real
demand shift abroad will affect the world equi-
librium real interest rate. U.S. nominal interest
rates will be affected accordingly.
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